This paper explores the tension between the stabilising appeal of consociationalism and its potential to ossify conflict lines. It does so through a comparative analysis of two case studies: Bosnia, where an externally imposed and territorially partitioned form of power-sharing was implemented after the 1995 Dayton Accords; and Northern Ireland, where the 1998 Good Friday Agreement institutionalised consociation in a more flexible — though still structurally rigid — format. While both cases have experienced extended periods of “peace”, they have also struggled with institutional dysfunction, symbolic conflict, and persistent elite-driven division. The core argument advanced here is that consociationalism is often a necessary framework for ending violence and establishing order in deeply divided societies. However, unless it is designed with mechanisms for flexibility, civic integration, and long-term transformation, it risks becoming a self-perpetuating system — one that entrenches division and rewards elite entrenchment rather than fostering democratic renewal. The key distinction, as this paper will argue, lies not in whether consociationalism is used, but in whether it is treated as a permanent settlement or a temporary scaffold toward more inclusive politics.
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