This study analyses the 1970 Dawson’s Field hijacking crisis, a pivotal event that underscored the increasing vulnerability of Western states to international terrorism. It examines West Germany’s response and the collective strategies devised by key Western nations – convened in Bern, including the USA, the UK, France, Switzerland, and Israel – to negotiate the release of approximately 450 hostages held by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Drawing on previously unexplored German archival materials, newspaper reports, and personal memoirs, this research sheds new light on the complexities of multilateral negotiations during the Dawson’s Field crisis. It highlights the nations’ – particularly West Germany’s – lack of preparedness for the emerging challenges of international terrorism and their tendency to prioritise unilateral solutions to secure the release of their citizens, often at the expense of multilateral cooperation. While the crisis exposed the limitations of international resolve and cooperation in the face of such threats, it also catalysed significant changes in airline security measures and heightened global awareness of the Israel/Palestine conflict. Crucially, the Dawson’s Field crisis revealed the inadequacies of ad hoc multilateral responses to terrorism and emphasised the urgent need for strategic approaches. However, it failed to serve as the wake-up call West Germany needed to effectively address the growing challenges of international terrorism.